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Miller, Constitutional Realism and the Politics of Brexit 
 
RICHARD EKINS AND GRAHAM GEE* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Miller litigation was a product of the politics of Brexit. Its central legal question was fairly 
discrete and technical: whether the Government could use the prerogative to give notice for the 
purposes of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union of WKH8.¶VLQtention to withdraw from the 
EU, or whether statutory authorization was required.1 However, the political context in which this 
legal question arose was fraught, with sore feelings and ragged nerves shaping public debate in the 
months after the referendum. It is not possible to make sense of Miller²the genesis and framing of its 
legal question, the hopes that many invested in the action, the frenzied atmosphere leading up to the 
oral hearing in the Supreme Court, and the reasoning that led a majority of the Justices to decide 
against the Government²without a heavy dose of constitutional realism. This requires, above all else, 
seeing Miller for what it was: an attempt by members of the political and legal elite to use the courts 
to delay political action implementing the result of the referendum in the hope that, somehow, it might 
ultimately be possible to thwart such action.  
In this chapter, we strive to pierce some of the myths and misunderstandings that have built 
up around Miller. In Part II we reflect on the difficulty so many in the political and legal elite had 
incoming to terms with the result of the referendum.2 This difficulty manifested itself in three 
powerful dynamics that have moulded much of the political and legal debate over the last year: 
namely, elite-led efforts to delegitimize the referendum; an elite-FRQFRFWHGQDUUDWLYHRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
FULVLV¶ DQG sustained and scattershot attempts to use litigation to delay and disrupt the process of 
withdrawing from the EU. Miller should be understood in light of these overlapping dynamics. In Part 
III, we consider the framing of and motivations for the Miller litigation, noting that it was argued in a 
way that was politically astute and powerful. The Supreme Court ought nonetheless to have upheld 
settled law and rejected the claim. 3DUW,9H[DPLQHVWKH&RXUW¶V judgment, arguing that the majority 
conflated constitutional practice and constitutional law, making unprincipled appeals to what they 
deemed realistic and unrealistic. In Part V, we consider why the Court may have decided as it did, 
pointing to the dubioXVDFFRXQWRIWKHVHSDUDWLRQRISRZHUVDWZRUNLQWKHPDMRULW\¶VUHDVRQLQJ:H
close in Part VI by reflecting on 0LOOHU¶V legacy, arguing that unless the reality of the litigation and 
judgment are squarely confronted, we may expect to see more ill-judged attempts to leverage judicial 
intervention into the political process for partisan advantage.   
 
II. THE REFERENDUM AND THE ELITE CRY OF RAGE 
The result of the referendum was a shock (despite neither the Leave nor Remain Campaigns having a 
decisive lead in the polls and notwithstanding the long-standing and widespread popular 
GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ ZLWK WKH 8.¶V PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 ,W ZDV HVSHFLDOO\ shocking to the legal and 
political elite, most of whom had strongly favoured remaining in the EU, with the weeks and months 
after the referendum notable for the difficulty many seemed to have in accepting WKHYRWHUV¶GHFLVLRQ 
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1
 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 WLR 583. 
2 :HXVHWKHWHUPµSROLWLFDOHOLWH¶WRUHIHUWRSROLWLFLDQVFLYLOVHUYDQWVand²following Dennis Kavanagh²µSROLWLFDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ such as 
political advisers, members of think-tanks, researchers and academics for whom high profile political activity at or near the heart of political 
life is part-time or a by-product of other roles6HH'.DYDQDJKµ&KDQJHVLQWKH3ROLWLFDO&ODVVDQGLWV&XOWXUH¶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Affairs 18, 27. µ/HJDOHOLWH¶denotes senior judges, leading practitioners, legal journalists and legal academics, all of whom in different ways 
are engaged in high profile legal arguments which help to shape the dominant legal culture. There are overlaps between the two categories, 
and the membership of each is not fixed. There were political and legal elites on both sides of the referendum, but it is widely accepted that 
WKHVWURQJSUHSRQGHUDQFHRISROLWLFDODQGOHJDOHOLWHRSLQLRQIDYRXUHGUHPDLQLQJLQWKH(87KLVFKDSWHU¶VIRFXVLVRQWKHPDny members of 
the political elite and (especially) legal elite who sought to use the law to delay or block political action implementing the referendum.  
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The public for the most part greeted the result with equanimity, with most voters who had 
supported continued membership appearing to view the referendum as a legitimate exercise in self-
government. In this, the public exhibited a sound and reassuring democratic impulse. The contrast is 
notable.  $QHOLWHµFU\RIUDJH¶3 reverberated in the period after the referendum, with many striving to 
frustrate the process of leaving the EU (and, in some cases, to delay that process in order to increase 
the likelihood of being able to frustrate it). No doubt the motives varied between the politicians, 
lawyers and others who considered themselves as under a GXELRXV µGHPRFUDWLF GXW\¶ WR RSSRVH
Brexit.4 Some took great care to voice their concerns about the referendum in a measured and 
respectful fashion, but alas many did not. Many despaired (in public and with far less restraint in 
private) that the conduct and result of the referendum reflected the puEOLF¶V LJQRUDQFH JXOOLELOLW\
and²above all²prejudice.5 In this, the referendum exposed not only the deep divide that ran across 
class, educational and generational lines,6 but also the staggering (and troubling) disregard that many 
elites felt about the vRWHUV¶ability to reach an informed and public-VSLULWHGDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHSROLW\¶V 
governing arrangements. Many elites steadfastly refused to view the referendum as a wholly 
intelligible (if contestable) evaluation by the public WKDWRQEDODQFHWKH8.¶Vlong-term interests ²
economic, social, cultural and political²would be best served by ceasing to be part of the EU.  
This elite cry of rage let loose three related and mutually reinforcing dynamics. The first was 
the attempt by many politicians and lawyers to delegitimize the referendum. Their objections were 
wide-ranging, embracing referendums in general and also this referendum in particular. Referendums 
should have no place, it was said, in a system of representative democracy. In respect of this specific 
referendum, it was argued that a decision of the magnitude of leaving the EU should have required a 
supermajority and/or majorities in each of the four nations of the UK. The franchise for this particular 
referendum was also characterised as unfair, on account of the exclusion of EU nationals in the UK 
who would be among those most affected by any decision to leave, and because votes had not been 
extended to 16 and 17 year olds.7 A common refrain was that the referendum was advisory not merely 
as a matter of law but also as a matter of constitutional practice, such that Parliament remained as free 
as ever²politically as well as legally²to GHSDUWIURPWKHµDGYLFH¶RIWKHYRWHUV8 Finally, motivated 
by a barely concealed disapproval of the result of referendum, some argued that the decision to leave 
the EU was of such significance that a second referendum was required, in which voters could select 
EHWZHHQWKHWHUPVRIDQ\GHDOWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQWQHJRWLDWHGRQWKHVKDSHRIWKH8.¶VSost-Brexit 
relationship with the EU on the one hand and remaining in the EU after all on the other.9  
None of these objections were persuasive. A convincing case can be made in representative 
democracies IRURFFDVLRQDOXVHRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIHUHQGXPV¶10 as a tool for resolving vital questions 
about the long-WHUP LGHQWLW\ RI WKH VWDWH VXFK DV WKH 8.¶V PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 7KLV FDVH KDV
particular force whenever elite consensus works to prevent certain questions that agitate the public at 
large from piercing the mainstream political agenda.11 Popular and elite assessments of the EU had 
diverged since the 1975 referendum. Over the same period the nature and scope of the European 
project had changed dramatically, and integration in particular had accelerated over the previous 25 
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Cardozo L Rev 101. 
4
 6HHHJ$:KHDOHµ7KH'HPRFUDWLF'XW\WR2SSRVH%UH[LW¶Political Quarterly 170. 
5
 Vernon Bogdanor offers an alternative view. Reflecting on the reaction of many elites to the referendum, Bogdanor FRPPHQWVWKDWµ>LQ
%ULWDLQ«WKHGDQJHURIELJRWU\DULVHVQRWIURPWKHH[HUFLVHRISRSXODUVRYHUHLJQW\RUSRSXOLVPEXWIURPWKHLQWROHUDQFHRIHOLtes²many of 
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9%RJGDQRUµ2Q3RSXODU6RYHUHLJQW\¶LQ'*DOOLJDQHGConstitution in Crisis: The New Putney Debates 
(London, IB Tauris & Co, 2017) 39, 43. 
6
 M -*RRGZLQDQG2+HDWKµ7KH5HIHUHQGXP%UH[LWDQGWKH/HIW%HKLQG$Q$JJUHJDWH-/HYHO$QDO\VLVRIWKH5HVXOW¶3ROLWLFDO 
Quarterly 323. See also H D Clarke, M Goodwin and P :KLWHOH\µ:K\%ULWDLQ9RWHG)RU%UH[LW$Q,QGLYLGXDO-Level Analysis of the 2016 
5HIHUHQGXP9RWH¶Parliamentary Affairs 439. 
7 See e.g. <1HKXVKWDQµ:K\WKH(85HIHUHQGXP¶V5HVXOW,V1RW0RUDOO\-3ROLWLFDOO\%LQGLQJ¶8.&RQVW/%ORJ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 6HHHJ3(OHIWKHULDGLVµ$1HZ5HIHUHQGXPLVD&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HTXLUHPHQW¶, Oxford law Business Blog (4 July 2016); and P 
(OHIWKHULDGLVµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,OOHJLWLPDF\2YHU%UH[LW¶Political Quarterly 182. 
9
 For an example of an overwrought piece that attempts to delegitimize the referendum on multiple grounds before calling for a second 
referendum that could arrive at µWKHDSSURSULDWHDQVZHU¶VHH/ Blom-&RRSHUµ7KH5HIHUHQGXPRI-XQH9RWLQJRQ(XURSH¶>@
PL (Brexit Special Issue) µ6HFRQGWKRXJKWVDVRWKHU(8PHPEHUVKDYHIRXQGPD\SURGXFHDSSURSULDWHDQVZHUV¶ 
10
 See generally S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (Oxford, OUP, 2012). 
11
 See generally R Ekins, µ7KH9DOXHRI5HSUHVHQWDWLYH'HPRFUDF\¶LQ&&KDUWHUVDQG'.QLJKWHGVWe the People(s): Participation in 
Governance (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2011) 29, 48. 
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years. Sustained discontent with European integration had been a feature of national politics for much 
of the last 40 years, yet 1983 was the last time that withdrawal had been advocated by a major party 
that enjoyed significant representation at Westminster.12 Seen in this light, the referendum was not 
just an appropriate way to test whether voters continued to consent to EU membership, but perhaps 
the only way of doing so. Arguments that the referendum was merely advisory as a political²and not 
just a legal²matter were at best obtuse or specious at worst. It was true that the European Union 
Referendum Act 2015 did not provide for how any decision to leave the EU was to be implemented, 
but no one who followed the campaign or who was familiar with the relevant political context, 
including the background to the 2015 Act itself, could have had any doubts that the referendum was 
intended to settle the question of whether or not to leave.13 Imposing a supermajority requirement for 
a decision to leave the EU or a requirement for a majority in each of the four nations would have 
broken new ground for a referendum in the UK and would have been read rightly as an attempt to 
squeeze out the prospect of any change to the status quo. Any elevated threshold would also have 
been inconsistent with the principle of the equality of each voter. Similarly unconvincing were 
arguments that the franchise was unfair.14 The franchise replicated that adopted in general elections, 
which was prudent given that any departure from this might have been interpreted as an underhand 
attempt to stack the deck in favour of the status quo.15 More generally, the time for raising objections 
such as these²and particularly arguments about the need for a second referendum²was before the 
referendum was held. There might have been a reasonable case to be made for sequential 
referendums²the first on whether or not to leave and a second on the terms of leaving²but only if 
provision for this had been made in advance, not as an ex post facto attempt by elites to upend the 
result of the referendum.  
A QDUUDWLYHRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFULVLV¶GHYHORSHGDORQJVLGHWKHelite-led attempts to delegitimize 
the referendum, and this was the second dynamic unloosed by the elite cry of rage.16 On this view, the 
referendum triggered a constitutional crisis17 (or, in some of the more sophisticated accounts, had laid 
bare fissures within and between the nations of the UK that will likely over time, and possibly a very 
short time, precipitate a constitutional crisis).18 This crisis narrative encompassed four overlapping 
themes. First, the referendum revealed deep fractures within a constitution that had traditionally 
commanded broad consensus that traversed ideological, geographical and socio-economic lines. 
Second, the referendum had catapulted to the top of the political agenda questions that risked 
fermenting division within²and ultimately the break-up of²the territorial constitution; questions, for 
example, about the future of the land border with the Republic of Ireland and questions about the 
allocation of repatriated powers between central and devolved tiers of government.19 Third, the 
constitution lacked the sort of clear and principled constitutional law needed to address questions such 
as these20 and, more generally, to manage political and legal change of the scale and complexity 
involved in leaving the EU. The domestic processes for withdrawal would be shaped instead by 
                                                             
12 Some might quibble with this and suggest instead that only a small section of the public ranked discontent with EU membership as 
amongst their main political priorities. It is difficult to deny, however, that discontent has been a central theme of the UK¶V membership of 
the EU, with a strong streak of scepticism a long-standing current in political discourse about the EU, albeit with the levels of discontent 
unevenly distributed across the UK. The literature on the tradition of Euroscepticism in UK politics is large, but useful overviews include: A 
*DPEOHµ%HWWHU2II2XW"%ULWDLQDQG(XURSH¶Political Quarterly 468; and O 'DGGRZµ0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU7RQ\%ODLUDQGWKH
(XURVFHSWLF7UDGLWLRQLQ%ULWDLQ¶British Journal of Politics and International Relations 210. 
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 It was clear throughout the parliamentary debates on the 2015 Act that the referendum was intended to give voters the final say on 
whether the UK should remain in the EU.  
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 Cf-6KDZµ7KH4XLQWHVVHQWLDOO\'HPRFUDWLF$FW"'emocracy, Political Community and Citizenship In and After the EU Referendum of 
-XQH¶Journal of European Integration 559. 
15
 The question of whether to extend the franchise to EU citizens and 16±17 year olds featured prominently in the parliamentary debates on 
the 2015 Act, but Parliament chose to adopt the franchise used in general elections. A legal challenge to the terms of the franchise was 
dismissed: Shindler v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster [2016] EWCA Civ 469, [2017] QB 226. 
16
 The language of constitutional crisis had been building in the months leading up to the referendum; see e.g. V Bogdanor, The Crisis of the 
Constitution: The General Election and the Future of the United Kingdom (London, Constitution Society, 2015). 
17
 See eg D Galligan (ed), Constitution in Crisis: The New Putney Debates (London, IB Tauris & Co, 2017); and A C Grayling, Democracy 
and Its Crisis (London, Oneworld, 2017). 
18
 See e.g. S Douglas-6FRWWµ%UH[LW$UWLFOHDQGWKH&RQWHVWHG%ULWLVK&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶016) 79 MLR DQG0/RXJKOLQµ7KH
(QGRI$YRLGDQFH7KH8.&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&ULVLV¶London Review of Books (28 July 2016). 
19
 For a clear-KHDGHGDQGVRSKLVWLFDWHGGLVFXVVLRQVHH$0F+DUJDQG-0LWFKHOOµ%UH[LWDQG6FRWODQG¶BJPIR 1. 
20
 See HJ)0DWWKHZVµ:KRVH0DQGDWH,V,W$Q\ZD\"%UH[LWWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKH&RQWHVWDWLRQRI$XWKRULW\¶Political 
Quarterly 1. 
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politics, with the risk that constitutional practice untamed by constitutional law would enable a power-
hungry central executive to sideline the UK Parliament and the devolved institutions. Finally, the 
constitution was about to take a step back into an age of unreason by eschewing the stable legal 
framework of the EU and returning to the permissive national legal framework that had existed prior 
to 1972. This was only the first such step: over time other progressive pillars of the constitution such 
as the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights would be targeted by the 
reactionary forces that successfully campaigned for withdrawal from the EU. Running throughout this 
narrative of crisis wDV FRQFHUQ DERXW WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶V FDSDFLW\ WR PDQDJH WKH UDGLFDO FKDQJH
LQYROYHGLQXQSLFNLQJSROLWLFDODQGOHJDOUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8DQGDIHDURIµWKHFRPLQJFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
LQVWDELOLW\¶21 But for many in the political and legal classes, this genuine concern was very difficult to 
disentangle from a deep and personally felt disappointment that the referendum had mandated radical 
constitutional change that not only disturbed the status quo, but departed from their preferences.  
In the aftermath of the referendum, this crisis narrative was never too far from the surface in 
debates about the implications of and process for leaving the EU.22 However, the language of crisis is 
cheap,23 and much of the post-referendum narrative was (as Levinson and Balkin put it in a different 
context) µWKHHTXLYDOHQWRISRXQGLQJWKHWDEOHDQGPDUNLQJRQH¶VXSVHWDERXWVRPHVWDWHRIDIIDLUVLQ
WKHZRUOG¶24 In any case, there was no constitutional crisis.25 There were abnormally high levels of 
politicDO FKDQJH DQG XQFHUWDLQW\ D SDUWLDO FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH FRQIOXHQFH RI WKH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU¶V
resignation the morning after the referendum and a failed coup against the Leader of the Opposition. 
New political territory was being entered: the process of leaving the EU would be overseen by a 
3DUOLDPHQWWKDWVWURQJO\IDYRXUHGWKH8.¶VFRQWLQXHGPHPEHUVKLSThis mismatch between elite and 
popular assessments of European integration gave rise to various complications, including the lack of 
adequate contingency work by the civil service in the event that the voters voted to leave the EU. The 
months following the referendum had also heightened tensions between the UK Government and the 
devolved administrations, and the Scottish Government in particular (but, once again, the public 
showed greater forbearance insofar as one of the consequences of the referendum was to temper 
enthusiasm for Scottish independence, at least in the short term). All of this could perhaps be said to 
have amounted to a political crisis, but it falls short (indeed, in our view, very significantly short) of a 
constitutional crisis.26 Such a crisis occurs principally where a constitution no longer makes politics 
possible; where serious failures within the constitutional architecture prevent politics addressing 
political uncertainty, change and conflict. A crisis, in other words, involves a serious breakdown of 
the constitutional order. This might arise where disputes cannot be resolved within the existing 
framework, or where key actors no longer adhere to the rules of the constitutional game.27  
There had been no such breakdown in the UK. Holding the referendum was an intelligible 
response to the diverging elite and popular assessments of the EU,28 and in its aftermath the 
Government was ULJKWO\ LQWHQW RQ LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKH YRWHUV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR OHDYH 7KH JRYHUQLQJ
apparatus has been tested in numerous ways since June 2016, and at various junctures the machinery 
of government has not always looked like a beacon of excellence. But there has been no rupture in 
basic constitutional processes. The constitution in action had enabled the governing institutions to 
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 3(OHIWKHULDGLVµ7KH&RPLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO,QVWDELOLW\¶>@PL 347. 
22 Invoking the language of crisis was not confined to those elites who were opposed to or concerned by the referendum result. Notably, The 
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least arguable that a genuine crisis would have resulted from the House of Commons or House of Lords defying the referendum result by 
refusing to pass legislation authorizing ministers to give notice under Article 50. It is also true that one might expect tabloid newspapers to 
be more sensationalist in their use of language than, for example, legal academics. See Daily Mail, Enemies of the People (4 November 
2016). 
23
 6HHJHQHUDOO\&+D\µ$&ULVLVRI3ROLWLFVLQWKH3ROLWLFVRI&ULVLV¶LQ'5LFKDUGV06PLWKDQG&+D\HGVInstitutional Crisis in 21st 
Century Britain (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014) 60, 77. 
24S Levinson and J 0%DONLQµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&ULVHV¶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U Penn L Rev 707, 714. 
25
 ibid. 
26
 Aileen McHarg offers a measured account, arguing that there was a political crisis in the months following the referendum, but that it 
remains an open question whether this might engender a constitutional crisis: A 0F+DUJµ1DYLJDWLQJ:LWKRXW0DSV&RQVWLWXWLRQDO6LOHQFH
and the Management of WKH%UH[LW&ULVLV¶) ICON (forthcoming). 
27
 K (:KLWWLQJWRQµ<HW$QRWKHU&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&ULVLV"¶Wm & Mary L Rev 2093. 
28
 3ODLQO\YLHZVGLIIHURQZKHWKHUWKHUHIHUHQGXPZDVHLWKHUQHFHVVDU\RUGHVLUDEOHFI3&UDLJµ%UH[LW$'UDPDLQ6L[$FW¶V
ELR DQG+7KRPSVRQµ,QHYLWDELOLW\DQG&RQWLQJHQF\7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI%UH[LW¶BJPR 1. 
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grapple with the novel, complex and challenging questions to which leaving the EU gives rise, 
although of course assessments will differ as to the soundness of the answers proffered to those 
questions. In saying all of this, we do not mean to downplay the scale of the challenges presented by 
leaving the EU. The challenges for the governing institutions are not merely political and legal, but 
cultural (adjusting to governing processes leavened by the removal of a supranational legal 
framework) and organizational (recruiting civil servants with new skill-sets, reallocating officials to 
new jobs and creating and staffing in short order a new department of state). We also do not deny that 
there have been episodes since the referendum where this or that actor has tried to stretch 
constitutional practice. We also acknowledge that there remain thorny questions still to be addressed, 
most notably questions relating to Northern Ireland. Our claim is simply that the crisis narrative was 
the concoction of panicked elites; the constitution has to date enabled politics to work in established 
ways and through settled processes, and in so doing has provided sufficient political stability to 
absorb the shock of the referendum result. For some, this might seem like a cavalier or complacent 
reading of the reverberations caused by the referendum, one that puts too much confidence in the 
traditional constitution to accommodate the unpredictable political forces unleashed by leaving the 
EU. However, in our view, precipitately invoking a narrative of crisis poses serious risks to the 
constitutional order. It distorts how political and legal actors discharge their constitutional functions²
perhaps even motivating them to neglect or betray their responsibilities²which risks bringing about 
the very crisis it aims to answer.  
These two dynamics²the HOLWHFULWLTXHRIWKHUHIHUHQGXP¶VOHJLWLPDF\DQGWKHHOLWH-contrived 
narrative of constitutional crisis²fuelled a final and related dynamic: the repeated attempts to initiate 
litigation to delay or disrupt the process of leaving the EU. The Miller litigation was only the most 
high profile of a number of attempts to relocate the politics of Brexit from the political realm to the 
legal arena. Other attempts included: a case brought in parallel to Miller asking whether the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998 had DEURJDWHGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSUHURJDWLYHWRgive notice under Article 50;29 the 
unsuccessful attempt by an English barrister to litigate in Dublin the question of whether notice under 
Article 50 was revocable, where the ultimate goal was to engineer a preliminary reference by the Irish 
High Court to the Court of Justice of the EU; and the threat hanging over the Government of litigation 
to secure the release of studies on the economic impact of the UK leaving the EU. Two further sets of 
legal proceedings are underway at the time of writing. The first is a case before the Court of Session, 
where a group of Scottish MPs, MEPs and MSPs²coordinated by the same English barrister behind 
the Dublin litigation²seek reference to the Luxembourg Court about whether the UK can unilaterally 
revoke its notice under Article 50. The second is in the High Court, where the claimant argues that the 
European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 does not include a formal µGHFLVLRQ¶to leave 
the EU as required under Article 50. The first is arguable (if difficult to square with Miller itself), but 
the second is not and should be dismissed out of hand. Some legal academics have been industrious in 
dreaming up other outlandish and²to be frank²legally absurd ways of attempting to upend the 
YRWHUV¶GHFLVLRQWROHDYHWKH(8. Philip Allott, for example, proposed that the courts could conclude 
that departing the EU was unlawful on the grounds that holding the referendum was not in the public 
interest and its ultimate result was unreasonable.30 Equally lacking any legal foundation was Yossi 
1HKXVKDQ¶V contention that it would be unlawful for the Prime 0LQLVWHU WR WDNH WKH UHIHUHQGXP¶V
result to be morally authoritative and that instead the courts should require her to treat the referendum 
as merely advisory and to consider it alongside the factors that weigh against withdrawal.31 Perhaps 
the high-water mark of this hyperactivity amongst the legal class was a letter in July 2016 to the 
Prime Minister signed by 1054 barristers SXUSRUWLQJWRUHFRQFLOHµWKHOHJDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGSROLWLFDO
LVVXHV¶ that arose from WKH UHIHUHQGXP E\ SURSRVLQJ µD 5R\DO &RPPLVVLRQ RU DQ HTXLYDOHQW
independent body to receive evidence and report, within a short, fixed timescale, on the benefits, costs 
DQGULVNVRIWULJJHULQJ$UWLFOHWRWKH8.DVDZKROHDQGDOORILWVFRQVWLWXHQWSRSXODWLRQV¶32 This 
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 5H0F&RUG¶V$SSOLFDWLRQ [2016] NIQB 85, [2017] 2 CMLR 7. 
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 3$OORWWµ)RUJHWWKH3ROLWLFV± %UH[LW0D\%H8QODZIXO¶The Guardian (30 June 2016). 
31 Y Nehushtan,¶:K\,V,W,OOHJDOIRUWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUWR3HUFHLYHWKH(85HIHUHQGXP¶V5HVXOWDV0RUDOO\-3ROLWLFDOO\$XWKRULWDWLYH"¶
UK Const L Blog (11 July 2016). 
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letter garnered press headlines but no political traction; it was emblematic, however, of the extent to 
which many in the legal class sought to conceal their own preferences for continued membership of 
the EU in the finery of (weak and ill-IRXQGHG µOHJDO DQDO\VLV¶ 7KH Miller litigation should be 
understood in the light of the wider pattern of lawyerly hyperactivity relating to Brexit; hyperactivity 
that preceded Miller and that has continued in its wake. As we explain in the next section, Miller 
differed from some of the other more fanciful legal analyses proposed in the aftermath of the 
referendum because it presented an arguable legal question that the claimants crafted in a politically 
potent fashion.  
III. POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS? FRAMING STRATEGIC LITIGATION 
The litigation in Miller was framed around a focused and technical question of constitutional 
law: whether the Government could use the SUHURJDWLYHWRJLYHQRWLFHRIWKH8.¶VLQWHQWLRQWROHDYH
the EU for the purposes of Article 50. The claimants submitted that fresh legislation was required to 
authorize the Government to initiate the Article 50 process, and relied on two main arguments to 
VXSSRUWWKLV)LUVWWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLWLHV$FWµ(&$¶ creates statutory rights that can only 
be diminished or abrogated by another statute. The triggering of Article 50 would lead to the UK 
leaving the EU, which would necessarily frustrate or erase these statutory rights. Since only an Act of 
Parliament can abrogate statutory rights, a statute was required to authorize ministers to trigger Article 
50. Second, the E&$¶VSXUSRVHZDVWRSURYLGHIRUthe UK¶V membership of the EU and to give effect 
in domestic law to the EU Treaties. Triggering Article 50 would put in motion a chain of events that 
would culminate in leaving the EU and the Treaties ceasing to have effect in the UK, thereby 
rendering the ECA an empty shell and frustrating its purpose. It was settled constitutional law that the 
Government cannot use its prerogative powers to frustrate a statute, and thus a statute was required to 
authorize ministers to issue the Article 50 notice. The claimants contended in the alternative that the 
(&$ DQG VXEVHTXHQW VWDWXWHV UHODWLQJ WR WKH (8 KDG LPSOLHGO\ DEURJDWHG WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V
prerogative to withdrawn from the EU Treaties.  
7KHFODLPDQWV¶DUJXPHQWVZHUHFOHYHUO\FUDIWed, but legally unsound for the reasons noted in 
section IV, not least because they mistook the contestable requirements of constitutional practice (i.e. 
what good practice and political prudence requires in a constitution such as WKH 8.¶V) for the 
requirements of constitutional law (i.e. what is required as a matter of law).33 Although legally flawed, 
WKHFODLPDQWV¶DUJXPHQWVwere a beguiling blend of tradition, prudence and politics, which was astute 
and powerful in political terms. The litigation was framed not as an attempt to flout the referendum 
but as vindicating traditional principles, most notably representative democracy and parliamentary 
sovereignty. By arguing that only an Act of Parliament could authorize ministers to invoke Article 50, 
the claimants depicted themselves as insisting only on lawful processes that would safeguard 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V UROH LQ WKLV PRPHQWRXV FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJH (FKRLQJ WKURXJKRXW WKH FODLPDQWV¶
submissions was the claim that for ministers to initiate the Article 50 process without statutory 
authorization would be the sort of executive overreach traditionally subject to parliamentary 
resistance and judicial checks. It is easy to forget, especially following the 2017 general election, the 
degree to which this resonated with concerns widely held by elites in the months after the referendum 
that Theresa May led an overbearing government that faced no credible opposition inside Parliament 
IURPD/DERXU3DUW\GLVWUDFWHGE\LWVRZQLQWHUQDOVFKLVPV:KDWLVPRUHWKHFODLPDQWV¶DUJuments 
overlapped with what many viewed as sound constitutional practice and political prudence. Even 
putting to one side any supposed legal requirement, it was arguable that, as a matter of constitutional 
practice and political prudence, ministers should have invited Parliament to signify its support for the 
triggering of Article 50, whether by way of primary legislation or a resolution of each chamber.34 Or 
to put this more bluntly: the litigation was intended, and widely thought, to place in a political bind 
those who believed that leaving the EU would lead to the reinvigoration of parliamentary sovereignty 
in a constitution freed from the constraints of EU law. Such Brexiteers might have felt instinctively 
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 133 LQR 347. 
34
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suspicious of the litigation yet found appealing its emphasis on giving Parliament the final decision 
whether and when to initiate Article 50.  
The litigation was presented as an attempt to affirm parliamentary sovereignty and to avoid 
ministers exceeding their lawful powers, but a realpolitik reading would see it as a subtle legal 
strategy that was seized on (and perhaps also concocted by) elites to delay or frustrate (or to delay in 
the hope of frustrating) the referendum result.35 Indeed, ZKDWHYHUWKHOLWLJDQWV¶DFWXDOPRWLYDWLRQVWKH
Miller litigation was µXQGRXEWHGO\SHUFHLYHG >DWOHDVWE\PDQ\@«as an attempt to prevent or to delay 
%UH[LW¶36 Motivations are complex of course, and may not always be fully understood by those who 
act on them. Still, it would be unsurprising if the political preferences of those most invested in the 
referendum tracked their support for (or opposition to) this litigation. The lead claimant, Gina Miller, 
GHVFULEHG WKH OLWLJDWLRQ DV DERXW µSURFHVV QRW SROLWLFV¶ EXW LW EHDUV QRWLQJ WKDW VKH ZDV DQ DFWLYH
supporter of the RHPDLQ&DPSDLJQZKRGHVFULEHGKHUVHOIDVKDYLQJIHOWµSK\VLFDOO\VLFN¶RQOHDUQLQJ
RIWKHYRWHUV¶GHFLVLRQWROHDYH37 and who in the 2017 election led a tactical voting initiative designed 
WRHPSRZHUFDQGLGDWHVZKRPLJKWYRWHDJDLQVWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHDOZLWKWKH(838  
Litigation was clearly an intelligent way, and perhaps the only realistic way, to delay the 
triggering of Article 50. Reflecting a year on from their influential blog-post that was the intellectual 
genesis for the litigation,39 Nick Barber, Tom Hickman and Jeff King acknowledge that delay was a 
fact that led them to explain why, in their view, legislation was required before Article 50 could be 
triggered As they saw it, the requirement to legislate would slow down the process of initiating Article 
µDWDWLPHRISROLWLFDOFULVLVZLWKLQWKH8.¶DQGWKerefore µSURYLGHPXFKQHHGHGEUHDWKLQJVSDFHIRU
politicaODFWRUV¶40 Delay would be in the national interest since it would allow the Government more 
time to determine its negotiating position as well as providing an opportunity to obtain commitments 
from the EU and other member states concerning the substance and process of the UK-EU 
negotiations.  
If delay is an admitted reason for litigation, then, it is important to acknowledge that, for 
many,41 the attraction of delay must also have been that it made it space for the UK to reverse course; 
if, for example, the economy soured encouraging public opinion to turn against withdrawal. Initiating 
the litigation itself generated delay. As importantly, if successful, litigation promised much more 
delay: the parliamentary process taking time and overcoming opposition in the House of Lords by 
way of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 might take at least a year. The litigation was never directly 
going to frustrate implementation of the referendum result, notwithstanding some of the wilder legal 
arguments noted above, for the courts clearly had no authority to rule as much. However, the litigation 
promised to (and in the end did) pass the decision whether or not to trigger Article 50 to MPs and 
peers, the overwhelming majority of whom had favoured the UK remaining a member of the EU and 
some of whom were openly contemplating defying the vote. In this way, the ensuing delay could be 
used to ramp up the pressure on Parliament to buck the will of the voters. Politically motivated 
litigation is far from unusual of course, and the motives of the litigants or those who were supportive 
of them are not strictly relevant to how the Supreme Court should have discharged its role. But it is 
reasonable to reflect frankly on the reasons why litigation was probably undertaken in order to grasp 
its constitutional significance and, relatedly, the importance attached to it by many in public life. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the claim and ruled that fresh legislation was required to trigger Article 
50.  This would have been an unobjectionable ruling if it had been truly required by law.  But in fact 
the judgment is legally unsound, as this section documents. Few notice, but strictly the Court did not 
take up the claimants¶ sweeping claims about the frustration of rights. Those claims were obviously 
problematic, for EU legal rights are not statutory rights. Parliament has never enacted the rights in 
question, but has instead made provision for rights in international law to have force in domestic law. 
EU legal rights in domestic law are treaty-based rights, not ordinary statutory rights. They depend for 
their force on the enabling statute and on their standing in international law. The Government lacks 
authority to set aside the ECA or to declare that EU legal rights in UK law are to be set aside. But it 
does not follow from this that the Government may not exercise the prerogative to change the position 
in international law, which in turn changes domestic law in accordance with the terms of the enabling 
statute itself.   
John Finnis analysed treaty-based rights in a series of papers for Policy ([FKDQJH¶V Judicial 
Power Project,42 which the Government relied on in argument before the Court. Elaborating and 
clarifying a line of argument that the Government introduced, but mishandled, before the Divisional 
Court, Finnis explored the parallel with double-tax treaties, a parallel established well before 1972.43 
Treaty-based rights rest on two bases: statute and treaty. An asymmetry exists in how treaty-based 
rights are introduced into domestic law and the manner in which they are terminated. They cannot be 
introduced into domestic law without both legislation and prerogative, but they can be terminated by 
prerogative alone, including via the exercise of termination rights within the relevant treaty itself. This 
asymmetry follows from the scheme of the legislation, which makes domestic law turn on the position 
at international law. Plainly, the constitutional significance of the treaty-based rights arising under 
double-tax treaties is relatively muted, at least as compared with EU legal rights under the EU 
Treaties. But it is this fact that makes the parallel instructive insofar that thinking about double-tax 
treaties renders the interplay between prerogative and legislation in the context of treaty-based rights 
clearer. The point is not that treaty-based rights are somehow unimportant, as Sionaidh Douglas-Scott 
wrongly assumed Finnis to be suggesting,44 and so ought to be liable to be destroyed without 
parliamentary debate. Rather, Parliament has made provision for these rights to have this particular 
foothold in domestic law, which entails that the Government is able to take action in the international 
realm that results in changes in domestic law, changes which Parliament itself intends and authorizes 
by virtue of the scheme of the legislation in question.  (Contrast cases in which Parliament chooses to 
incorporate international obligations directly into statute, such that changes in international law do not 
in turn change domestic law.) The Government remains answerable to Parliament for its actions. 
Parliamentary debate, or the threat of debate, may stop a proposed course of action, but legislation is 
not required. The Court did not properly consider the double-tax parallel. The majority dismissed it in 
short order,45 noting that the parallel had not been explored in oral argument (but it was made out 
clearly in written submissions, which included responses to all counter-arguments identified by 
claimants¶ counsel). The majority merely asserted that the parallel had been answered in unspecified 
ways and with unspecified arguments by unnamed third parties. This is not the careful attention to 
logically make-or-break, decisive detail that one might reasonably expect from eight judges in an 
important and high profile case.46  
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Still, the majority clearly saw that EU legal rights are not ordinary statutory rights and that 
they can and do change without parliamentary involvement, for the content of EU legal rights is a 
question of EU law.47 However, the majority went on to say that the constitutional processes by which 
UK law is made can only be changed by Parliament and that using the prerogative to withdraw from 
the Treaties would amount to the executive unilaterally removing a source of domestic law. This 
would µHIIHFW a fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements of the >8.>¶48 by µFXW>Wing] off 
[this] source of law entirely¶.49 The majority proceeded to assert that fundamental constitutional 
change (of this kind?) requires legislation. They rejected the argument articulated by Lord Reed in 
dissent, viz. that withdrawal effected by executive action changes the international legal position, to 
which the Act then gives effect.50 As we see it, the PDMRULW\¶V argument turned on a deeply confused 
account of how EU law is received in domestic law. 
The majority recognised, of course, that EU law¶s standing in domestic law turned entirely on 
the ECA, hence the rule of recognition had not been changed,51 but, remarkably, added that µin« a 
more realistic sense where EU law applies in the [UK], it is the EU institutions which are the relevant 
source of that law¶.52 Likewise, it was said to be µXQUHDOLVWLF to deny that, so long as that [ECA] 
remains in force, the EU Treaties, EU legislation and the interpretations placed on these instruments 
by the Court of Justice are direct sources of UK law¶53 This emphasis on what the majority regarded 
as unrealistic led the majority to the extraordinary conclusion that the ECA constitutes EU law as µDQ 
independent and overriding source of domestic law¶.54 The majority also asserted that the ECA 
µHIIHFWLYHO\ operates as a partial transfer of law-making powers, or an assignment of legislative 
competences, by Parliament to the EU lawmaking LQVWLWXWLRQV¶55 In the same paragraph the Court 
refers to passages quoted in Lord 5HHG¶V dissent from Van Gend en Loos56 and Costa v ENEL.57 
According to the majority, those passages µGHPRQVWUDWH that rules which ZRXOG«QRUPDOO\ be 
incompatible with UK constitutional principles, became part of our constitutional arrangements as a 
result of the ECA and the 1972 Accession Treaty for as long as the ECA remains in IRUFH¶58 
The references to what is realistic or unrealistic indicated that the majority had abandoned 
principled legal analysis.59 The position the Court adopted was incoherent on its own terms and 
inconsistent with settled law: EU law is not an independent, overriding or direct source of UK law.60 
The effect of EU law in the UK is radically dependent on the ECA, and hence neither independent nor 
direct. EU law does not override other sources of law as such, but rather takes effect notwithstanding 
inconsistency with other legal propositions, per the terms of section 2(1) and (4) of the ECA, to the 
extent that subsequent Acts take for granted and thus maintain this rule of priority.61 As Lord Reed 
notes in his dissent, section µHQDEOHV(8 law to be given direct effect in our domestic law, but 
within a framework established by Parliament, in which parliamentary sovereignty remains the 
IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOH¶62 $VKHH[SODLQVODWHURQLQKLVGLVVHQWµ>V@ince EU law has no status in UK 
law independent of statute, it follows that the only relevant source of law has at all times been 
VWDWXWH¶63 Parliament cannot transfer its law-making powers to any other institution; it can only give 
effect to some other institution¶s acts. Further, the UK, like many other member states, has never 
accepted the Court of Justice¶s self-understanding. In affirming that the status of EU law is dependent 
on a continuing statutory basis, section 18 of the European Union Act 2011 makes this clear, as 
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LQGHHGGRGLFWDIURPWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQV LQPham64 and HS2.65 In Miller, the PDMRULW\¶V
µrealism¶ led it to contrive a deeply mistaken account of how EU law takes effect in domestic law.66  
The reception of EU law in UK law depends on the ECA and the Treaties, which entails that 
the continuing effect of EU law in domestic law expires either if the ECA is repealed or if the Treaties 
cease to apply to the UK. The ECA might have limited the Government¶s power to withdraw from the 
Treaties, but if it did not then the Government may set in motion Article 50¶s provisions for bringing 
the application of the Treaties to the UK to an end. As Lord Reed made clear, the ECA µVLPSO\ 
creates a scheme under which domestic law reflects the UK¶s international obligations, whatever they 
may be¶.67 Lord Reed noted that the ECA came into force before the Treaties were ratified, such that 
for a time there were no Treaties to which the ECA applied and it introduced no new legal rights into 
our law.68 In answer to Lord Reed, the majority suggested that:  
 
by the 1972 Act, Parliament endorsed and gave effect to the UK¶s future membership of the 
European Union, and this became a fixed domestic starting point. The question is whether 
that domestic starting point, introduced by Parliament, can be set aside, or could have been 
intended to be set aside, by a decision of the UK executive without express Parliamentary 
authorisation.69   
 
The majority raises an arguable point about the intention of the ECA.70 However, what bears 
emphasis is that the ECA does not commit the UK to membership of the EU. Indeed, it did not even 
require entry into the EEC, as it then was.71 The (&$¶V long title is µDQ Act to make provision in 
connection with the enlargement of the European communities¶, not an Act to make provision for 
such enlargement, as some have wrongly said.72 Nor does the ECA in any other way purport to bring 
about this enlargement, as the Divisional Court mistakenly suggested.73 More generally, the majority 
misunderstood the ECA. The structure of the ECA is that if and when defined Treaties come into 
force or change internationally, domestic law changes too. Changes in domestic law might follow 
from executive action (whether on or under the Treaties) and need not involve legislation. While 
section 1(2) requires primary legislation to amend the Act to recognise major new treaties, section 
1(3) recognises ancillary treaties that are declared as such by Order in Council and supported by a 
resolution of each House.74 This is a scheme for parliamentary control, but not a scheme that requires 
primary legislation for the scope of effective EU law (including any or all of the EU Treaties that have 
come into force) to change.  
The crux of the majority judgment in Miller was a striking and unsubstantiated assertion that 
withdrawal from the Treaties would be a constitutional change that cannot be for ministers alone. 
Such a momentous constitutional change, the majority claimed, could only be affected through 
legislation. The majority noted that withdrawing from the EU would be as significant a change as that 
which occurred when the ECA had first incorporated EU law into domestic law.75 They further noted 
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%DUF]HQWHZLF]µ7KH&RUH,VVXHLQMiller: The Relevance of Section 1 of the 1972 Act (4 January 2017). 
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that once notification of withdrawal is given to the EU under Article 50 this change will occur 
irrespective of whether Parliament repeals the ECA. It was in this light that the majority asserted that:  
 
It would be inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental principles for such a far-
reaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements to be brought about by ministerial 
decision or ministerial action alone.76  
The majority continued by saying: 
We cannot accept that a major change to UK constitutional arrangements can be achieved by 
ministers alone; it must be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, 
namely by Parliamentary legislation. This conclusion appears to us to follow from the 
ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to the present issue.77 
 
The majority cited no authority for these propositions. The reason for the lack of authority is very 
simply stated: there is none. No principle of the UK constitution²or of UK constitutional law in 
particular²requires that major change must be realised by primary legislation.78 The history of the 
8.¶V membership of the EU illustrates the point. Entry into the EU treaties was an act of immense 
significance. But it was neither required nor authorised by legislation and was, in law, an exercise of 
the prerogative. It is true that Parliament by resolution approved in principle the entry into the 
Treaties, with the ECA subsequently enacted to make provision in connection with the Treaties in due 
course. This is not the same, however, as requiring ratification of the Treaties, and likewise is not the 
same as withdrawal. If Parliament chooses to make major legal consequences turn on the power of 
ministers to change UK obligations in international law, then ministers may make very significant 
decisions, and so it is with the ECA. 
In asserting (without evidence) that significant constitutional change in the UK can only be 
effected via legislation, the majority ran together what may or may not be good constitutional practice 
with what is valid constitutional law. Several points later on in the judgment confirm that the majority 
confused the two (or: possibly abandoned the latter to secure its perception of the former). The first is 
the assertion that it is implausible to say that ministers could have withdrawn the UK from the 
Treaties on or after the ECA came into force, with or without the referendum or even in defiance of a 
popular vote to remain.79 Strikingly, the majority noted that µit would clearly be appropriate¶ for 
withdrawal from the Treaties to be a power that did not exist unless and until Parliament explicitly 
accorded it to ministers.80 The majority also remarked later, albeit without relying on the point, that 
EHFDXVH ZLWKGUDZDO ZLOO QHFHVVLWDWH PXFK OHJLVODWLRQ WKHUH LV µD JRRG SUDJPDWLF DUJXPHQW¶ WKDW
ministers should not impose this burden on Parliament without prior authorization by statute, all of 
ZKLFK FRQILUPHG IRU WKHPDMRULW\ WKH VFDOH RI WKH FKDQJH DQG WKXV µWKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURSULHW\ RI
prior Parliamentary sanction¶81The majority addressed the counter-argument that ministers would of 
course be accountable for their exercise of the prerogative, dismissing it as µa potentially controversial 
argument constitutionally¶.82  It is true that ministerial accountability is not a reason to be cavalier 
about the scope and legal limits of executive power, but what the majority fails to recognize is the 
UHOHYDQFH RU FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LPSRUWDQFH RI UHVSRQVLEOH JRYHUQPHQW 7KH *RYHUQPHQW¶V
accountability to Parliament, and especially to the House of Commons, is a vital restraint on its 
powers, including for example its undeniable legal power to commit the UK to war with any or all 
RWKHU(8PHPEHUVWDWHV7KLVWKHQLVWKHDQVZHUWRWKHPDMRULW\¶VVFHSWLFLVPDERXWZLWKGUDZDOIURP
                                                                                                                                                                                             
FKDQJHWRWKHIXQGDPHQWDOVRIWKH8.FRQVWLWXWLRQ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the EU apart from or in defiance of the referendum result. It would not be constitutionally improper 
for the Government to trigger Article 50 if supported by the House of Commons, if say it had 
contested an election on a manifesto commitment to withdrawal.  It would be politically unthinkable 
for the Government to propose to initiate the Article 50 process in defiance of a popular vote to 
remain, and the House of Commons would ensure as much. It might be contended that this would be 
XQODZIXO LQDQ\HYHQW LQYLHZRIYRWHUV¶ OHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQ WKDWPLQLVWHUs would implement the 
RXWFRPHRIWKHUHIHUHQGXP%XWLWZRXOGEHPXFKEHWWHUWRVD\WKDWWKHUHIHUHQGXP¶VRXWFRPHVKRXOG
be honoured, and if the Government proposed otherwise it would have to explain itself to the Houses 
of Parliament and the electorate. It is the principle of responsible government that renders intelligible 
the scheme that Parliament enacted in 1972, and took for granted and extended in subsequent 
legislation.83 Recognizing the relevance and force of this principle avoids the rash assumption that 
legal disability is required to prevent the misuse of executive power. 
 
2QRXUUHDGLQJWKHPDMRULW\¶VFRQFOXVLRQ²that the prerogative does not extend to triggering 
Article 50 and withdrawal from the Treaties²was driven by presuppositions about what is and is not 
constitutionally proper. The presuppositions are not well made, and are contestable at best. More to 
the point they do not support the Supreme Court¶s conclusions about the law. It is almost too obvious 
a point to state, but clearly bears emphasis: the Court does not have authority to enforce constitutional 
principle writ large. Its authority is confined to law, a point on which the majority quite properly 
relied in dismissing the challenges arising from the devolutionary settlements.84 The only plausible 
legal ground on which Miller could rest is that the ECA impliedly limited the exercise of the 
SUHURJDWLYHWRZLWKGUDZIURPWKH7UHDWLHV7KLVLVDTXHVWLRQXOWLPDWHO\DERXW3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQ
in 1972, to be answered by attending to the context of WKH (&$¶V enactment. The assertion that 
Parliament simply must have intended to oust the prerogative is ungrounded and does not cohere with 
the interplay between executive and legislative action in taking the UK into the EEC. It implausibly 
attributes the EU¶s legal self-understanding to the 1972 Parliament. The majority also turned the idea 
of legality on its head, asserting first that one cannot attribute to Parliament µthe notion that it was 
clothing ministers with the far-reaching and anomalous right to use a treaty-making power to remove 
an important source of domestic law and important domestic rights¶85 and later that µ[t]he fact that a 
statute says nothing about a particular topic can rarely, if ever, justify inferring a fundamental change 
in the law¶.86 Yet, it was the majority that took the silence of the ECA to have effected a fundamental 
change: namely, abrogation of the Government prerogative of making and unmaking treaties. 
Parliament did not clothe ministers with anomalous authority in enacting the ECA. Rather, Parliament 
avoided anything suggesting intent to abrogate the prerogative, the continuing exercise of which it 
took for granted, as subsequent Acts confirm, with ministers always remaining accountable to 
Parliament when exercising the prerogative.  
V. WHO GUARDS THE CONSTITUTION? 
 
Miller is remarkable, but not in a good way. Eight of eleven Supreme Court justices commit 
themselves to a judgment that perceives, at least in part, the central flaw in the claimants¶ case, but 
nonetheless gives judgment in her favour by adopting an incoherent, incompletely reasoned and 
unprincipled account of EU ODZ¶V standing in UK law. Their judgment conflates constitutional 
propriety (itself misunderstood) with constitutional law, and in so doing departs from the rule of law, 
and, finally and in consequence, misconstrues the ECA. The judgment is constitutionally confused, 
unnecessary, and dangerous. It risked exposing the Justices to political criticism and could have been 
disastrous for their reputation and the rule of law. 
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But why did the Court decide in this way? The judgment betrays an ambition to superintend 
constitutional practice rather than to uphold constitutional law. The majority reasons that in our 
constitution it should be Parliament rather than the Government that decides that the UK should 
withdraw from the Treaties. It then transmutes this (contestable) proposition about constitutional 
practice into a rule of constitutional law, which it attributes to the Parliament that enacted the ECA. 
What is more, the &RXUW¶V claim is not just that the Government must seek express authorization from 
the Houses of Parliament, or at least the Commons, before triggering Article 50, say by a resolution, 
but that the decision to trigger must be authorized by a statute. (A resolution had of course been 
adopted by the House of Commons on 7 December 2016.) Within the logic of its own reasoning, the 
majority has no choice but to insist on legislation, rather than resolution, because to be satisfied by the 
latter would have made it clear that parliamentary support is not a legal requirement. More 
importantly, parliamentary control is not for judges to secure. The Supreme Court is not the guardian 
of the constitution, somehow charged with spurring the political authorities to do their constitutional 
duty. The Court betrays its own responsibility when its acts in such a way. 
Not everyone appreciates this. It is all too common for lawyers to speak unthinkingly of the 
Justices as µWKH guardians of the constitution¶ as indeed Lady Hale did in an ill-judged speech in 
Malaysia shortly after the Divisional &RXUW¶V decision in Miller.87 True, the majority (including Lady 
Hale) seemed to distance itself from such grandiose thinking when saying, rightly, that µMXGJHV are 
neither the parents nor the guardians of political conventions¶.88 But this welcome discipline did not 
inform the balance of the &RXUW¶V judgment, where its view of constitutional practice was refashioned 
into an enforceable point of constitutional law.89 
Or to put this point differently: the litigation succeeded because the Supreme Court took up 
the claimants¶ implicit invitation to serve as the guardian of the constitution by protecting a 
browbeaten Parliament from an over-mighty executive. To fulfill its guardianship function, the 
Court²on this thinking²had to disable the executive from initiating the withdrawal process without 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V DVVHQW WR SULPDU\ OHJLVODWLRQ ,QWHUYHQLQJ ZLWKRXW DQ\ OHJDO EDVLV LQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS
between the Houses of ParliamHQWDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWZDVDPLVXVHRIWKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ7KH
decision also provides further evidence that many of our leading judges do not have a good grasp of 
the nature and dynamics of that relationship. That relationship is animated by the principle of 
responsible government, framed by constitutional convention, and is the site of complex political and 
electoral dynamics. It is not true that unless an Act of Parliament is required to trigger Article 50, the 
Government would be free from parliamentary control. It is also a serious over-simplification to 
VXJJHVW WKDW WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V GXW\ LV WR DFW RQ GLUHFWLRQ IURP WKH +RXVHV RI 3DUOLDPHQW 7KH
Government is drawn from and can at any point be unseated by the Commons. But it is 
constitutionally entitled to frame and execute its policy, which (other) parliamentarians are able to 
scrutinize, critique, or oppose. It is true that the Government initially refrained from inviting the 
Houses of Parliament to express their support for Article 50 to be triggered, whether by resolution or 
by legislation, perhaps because it feared that one or other chamber, or possibly both, might obstruct its 
policy of honouring the referendum. This may have been unwise or it may have been an intelligent 
response to the politics of the moment, of which the narrative of constitutional crisis and attacks on 
the legitimacy of the referendum chronicled above formed major parts. In any case, the Houses of 
Parliament were not passive bystanders: they had the capacity, which they used, to question the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURDFK ERWK RQ SURFHVV DQG VXEVWDQFH 7KH UKHWRULF DERXW WKH OLWLJDWLRQ VDYLQJ
Parliament from being sidelined is simply misleading (and misunderstands the executive-legislative 
relationship), as is the subsequent complaint that Parliament squandered the opportunity which the 
courts (and the claimants) secured for them. Miller is alas not the first (and at this rate will not be far 
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from the last) case in which senior judges fail to understand responsible government and either fail to 
respect, or attempt to compensate for perceived deficiencies in, political accountability.90   
In any case, it is beyond artificial to treat this case as if the Government somehow decided to 
trigger Article 50 in a fit of pique. If, as we suggest, the majority was concerned with optimal 
constitutional practice²or, to use language adopted by the majority, if constitutional µUHDOLVP¶ is the 
focus²then the referendum matters. The Court sets this aside as irrelevant. If in the rest of its 
judgment, the Court had hewed closely to settled law, leaving both the prerogative unimpaired and the 
significance of the referendum to the free flow of political argument between the political authorities 
and the electorate, this would have been an unobjectionable analysis. However, the majority is 
inconsistent in its interest in and recourse to constitutional realism: certain aspects of constitutional 
practice are plucked out as relevant in order to offer a realistic analysis, whilst other things are 
ignored. This can be seen in the odd conception of the status of EU law within the UK, even if the 
majority has somehow persuaded itself that its (novel and incoherent) account is legally sound. It is 
especially evident in the PDMRULW\¶V assertions about the importance of withdrawal and the importance 
of Parliament rather than Government making a decision of this magnitude. What about the electorate 
itself, which Parliament had invited to decide the question by way of the referendum established by 
the European Union Referendum Act 2015? The point is not that that Act authorizes triggering Article 
50. It does not. But the referendum was the means that Parliament chose to settle the question of 
whether or not to withdraw.91 In proposing to trigger Article 50 the executive acted in reliance on the 
HOHFWRUDWH¶V decision, which rather upends the &RXUW¶V framing of the question as whether Parliament 
or Government should decide. Finally, those disappointed claimants who relied on the devolution 
settlements might reasonably ask why constitutional realism is good for some claimants but not for 
them.92 In short, the &RXUW¶V asymmetric constitutional realism is a major problem: the preferences 
and dispositions of some are privileged by the judgment.93   
Timothy Endicott, as stern a critic of the judgment as any, speculates about whether it might 
nevertheless be possible to rationalize Miller as a justified constitutional innovation, like others before 
it.94  There have been times in the 8.¶V long constitutional tradition after all when the courts have 
helped to secure constitutional principle by changing the law of the constitution. This was not such a 
time (and indeed the claimants and judges disavow any such ambition, insisting that it was simply 
application of settled law). Courts ought not to be innovating in this way. Recall what innovation in a 
high-stake and politically salient case involves: exposure to fierce (and likely justified) political 
criticism for departing from settled law. In any case, as Endicott points out, the judgment serves no 
grand principle. It is at best an exercise in formality, in which courts demand sanctification of a major 
decision. Requiring an Act of Parliament before Article 50 is triggered does not correct a shortcoming 
in our constitutional arrangements and stands in poor comparison to the great cases of earlier times. 
Still, the echo of history is at work in the judgment. Writing shortly after the Divisional 
&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQRQHRIXVREVHUYHGWKDWµ>W@KHWHPSWDWLRQIRUWhe Justices will be to abandon the law 
under the guise of apparent continuity with constitutional history. This whole litigation has been an 
exercise in tempting the courts. There are reasons to hope that in the end a majority will resist the 
WHPSWDWLRQ¶95 The claimants²and their many supporters in the press, bar and academy²played up 
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the opportunity for the courts at a time of supposed constitutional crisis to stand with their illustrious 
forbears, once again defying executive abuses to vindicate the privileges of Parliament, not to mention 
WKHGRFWULQHRISDUOLDPHQWDU\VRYHUHLJQW\7KHµVWXEERUQVWDLQWKHRU\¶RIH[HFXWLYHSRZHUDV(QGLFRWW
terms it,96 is much in evidence, where the executive is taken to be the wicked stepmother of the 
constitution, with any and all restrictions imposed on it being to the good.97 However, it flatters the 
Justices to present them as a bench of latter-day Edward Cokes resisting King James. References in 
SXEOLFGHEDWHWRWKHµDQFLHQW¶UR\DOSUHURJDWLYHFRPSOHWHZLWKFODQNLQJFKains, were a parody of the 
true state of affairs. The Government was not arbitrary, imperious or unaccountable, and the 
prerogative power to conduct foreign policy is neither mysterious nor disreputable. Indeed, in this 
context, the Government was acting in pursuit of the constitutional obligation entailed by the 
referendum, and stands in favourable contrast to the MPs, peers and others who contemplated defying 
its outcome. As we explained earlier, the Miller litigation was designed to disrupt, if only through 
GHOD\WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQWRKRQRXUWKHXQGHUWDNLQJZKLFKZDV3DUOLDPHQW¶VDVPXFKDVWKH
*RYHUQPHQW¶VWRYRWHUVWRJLYHHIIHFWWRWKHLUGHFLVLRQWKDWWKH8.VKRXOGOHDYHWKH(8 
The Supreme &RXUW¶V eventual judgment was not unexpected and of course explains the 
reasons on which it is based. Our commentary above suggests how that reasoning should be 
understood. However, more can be said about how the Court ended up deciding as it did and this 
reflection is useful in evaluating the judgment and in determining what its legacy for our constitution 
may be. We have already noted that the litigation arose in the febrile atmosphere after the referendum, 
in which an enraged minority (disproportionately represented in media, law, and the academy) flailed 
about in desperate search of a way to spike the UHIHUHQGXP¶V guns and of encouraging a narrative of 
constitutional crisis. Unsurprisingly, the litigation served as a lightning-rod (and a reservoir of hope) 
for efforts to stop Brexit in its tracks. Its success seemed to offer the only salient, if far-fetched, means 
so to do. Some of the Justices might have shared these hopes, but we very much doubt they ruled 
against the Government in order to spike Brexit (not least since it was clear that this was a forlorn 
hope when²coincident with the third day of the oral hearing before the Supreme Court²MPs 
adopted a resolution backing withdrawal by 448 to 75). But some of them might have viewed a defeat 
for the Government as a salutary blow against the Brexiteers, exposing their alleged hypocrisy in 
abandoning parliamentary sovereignty when convenient. They may also have shared the perception 
that the UK constitution was in (or on the precipice of) a constitutional crisis. Here, the vehement 
media criticism of the Divisional &RXUW¶V judgment, together with the frenzied overreaction of the 
legal community to the Lord &KDQFHOORU¶V supposed failure to respond adequately to it,98 was likely 
relevant in stiffening the resolve of the Justices to defend their colleagues and defy the rabble-rousers. 
Similarly, the legal reaction to the substance of the Divisional &RXUW¶V judgment is important as well, 
for many lawyers and commentators began to speak of the judgment as irrefutable and to characterise 
the *RYHUQPHQW¶V appeal as hopeless. If the Divisional Court had ruled against the claimants it would 
have been more difficult for the Supreme Court to go astray. Finally, the resolution of the Commons 
that coincided with the hearing suggested that defeat in the Supreme Court would be unlikely to 
frustrate the triggering of Article 50 since ministers would be able to secure fresh legislation if need 
be. This lowered the political salience of the litigation, which may have made the Court less 
responsible in ruling that legislation was required.99 
 
VI. NOTES ON THE NEXT µCRISIS¶ 
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The Supreme Court was wrong to rule that the Government had no legal power to trigger Article 50. 
However, the Government accepted the &RXUW¶V ruling with no public fuss, and moved swiftly to 
introduce a Bill in Parliament. The Bill was narrowly cast, comprising only two sections that 
empowered the Prime Minister to give notice to the EU under Article 50 and made clear that this 
power was not subject to any other enactment.100 The resulting Act in one sense reversed the outcome 
of Miller, restoring the antecedent legal position in which the Government had the authority to trigger 
Article 50. Of course one can equally say that the Act could not and did not reverse Miller, for the 
whole point of that judgment (in law) was to hold that an Act was required, and the judgment did not 
specify the form legislation would have to take to authorize withdrawal.   The narrowness of the 
European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 disappointed many, not least those who 
hoped that, duly empowered, Parliament would refuse to support withdrawal or at least impose 
onerous preconditions and/or make provision for a second referendum. Yet, despite some lawyers 
hinting otherwise,101 it would have been outrageous, and unlawful, for the Supreme Court to dictate to 
Parliament the terms on which it had to proceed to manifest an intention to authorize the Government 
to begin withdrawal.   
Still, the Supreme &RXUW¶V judgment in Miller had more constitutional significance than its 
swift legislative disposition might imply. It changed the nature of the exchange between the 
Government, Lords and Commons, forcing it to take the form of deliberation about a bill, rather than 
a more open-ended debate culminating in a resolution. Many amendments were moved by MPs and 
peers, including some wrecking amendments. The Commons decisively supported a narrowly cast bill 
and did so in the face of initial resistance from the House of Lords. Indeed, the main implication of 
Miller, as was clear throughout the litigation, was the empowerment of the Lords, making its assent 
necessary for Article 50 to be triggered and giving peers the power to delay withdrawal by up to a 
year, if the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 had to be invoked. The Commons kept faith with the 
resolution of 7th December and with the outcome of the referendum and were unwilling to accept 
amendments proposed by the Lords²and in the end the Lords too assented. Seen in light of these 
developments, the outcome of the Miller litigation was in a sense happy. The &RXUW¶V judgment 
introduced merely the possibility, not the reality, of delay or frustration of withdrawal from the EU. 
The judgment might easily have been received in a very different temper, with the electorate asking 
why the Court was lending its authority to a scheme to keep the UK within the EU. (It is likely that 
the fact that three judges dissented helped minimise damage to the &RXUW¶V reputation.) The Court 
acted wrongly but otherwise the constitution worked: the Government responded swiftly, the 
Commons was politically responsible, and the Lords acknowledged the primacy of the Commons. If 
the Lords and the Commons had acted otherwise, the judgment would have been momentous and 
might very well have invited withering (and justified) political criticism, possibly culminating in a 
genuine crisis. Something similar can be said for the general election that took place a few months 
later, in which the overwhelming majority of the newly returned House of Commons was elected on 
manifesto commitments to honour the referendum, to withdraw from the EU, and to bring free 
movement to an end. These political dynamics further confirm, if there was any doubt, the 
shallowness of all of the loose talk about a constitutional crisis and the subversion of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Rather, a referendum for which Parliament made provision in 2015 is being taken 
seriously by the 8.¶V representative institutions and electors.    
However, there is a sting in the tail. The dynamics unleashed in the post-referendum elite cry 
of rage, and from which the Miller litigation emerged, have not altogether receded. Lawyers continue 
to threaten all manner of outlandish lawsuits when the twists and turns of parliamentary and electoral 
politics seem to them inauspicious. Strictly speaking, the various lawsuits could be viewed as lawyers 
advising clients on questions put to them, and in so doing merely opining on the merits of possible 
litigation. This analysis stretches credulity. Much (and perhaps most) of the legal posturing is 
                                                             
100
 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, section 1(2). 
101
 In an exceptionally ill-DGYLVHGFRPPHQWVKRUWO\DIWHUWKH'LYLVLRQDO&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWDQGZKHQLWZDVNQRZQWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW
LQWHQGHGWRDSSHDOWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW/DG\+DOHKDGVXJJHVWHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH0LOOHUOLWLJDWLRQWKDWµ>D@QRWKHUTXHVtion is whether 
it would be enough for a simple Act of Parliament to authorise the government to give notice, or whether it would have to be a 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHUHSODFHPHQWIRUWKH$FW¶7KLVTXHVWLRQKDGQRWIHDWXUHGLQWKH'LYLVLRQDO&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQWRUWKHFODLPDQWV¶
submissions. Lady Hale, The Supreme Court: Guardian of the Constitution, Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (9 November 2016) at 12. 
 17 
politically motivated, and many (and perhaps most) of the prominent lawyers involved are willing 
participants in this dynamic, initiating (threats of) litigation, coordinating various legal proceedings, 
and acting pro bono or for reduced fees in exchange for political access and impact. The strategic 
threat of litigation is constitutionally problematic. Consider the so-called ³7KUHH .QLJKWV´ Opinion, 
published by eminent lawyers in February 2017 while the Bill providing for notification under Article 
50 was under consideration.102 The Opinion asserts that the Bill then before Parliament was incapable 
of authorising the 8.¶V withdrawal from the EU as a matter of UK law. The argument was two-fold: 
first, the Bill did not specify which rights were to be abrogated and therefore, under the principle of 
legality, it should not be interpreted to bring to an end the effect of any EU legal rights in UK law; 
second, and more fundamentally, no statute could authorise withdrawal at this stage because the shape 
of any UK-EU deal was unknown and Parliament must legislate expressly to authorise the terms of 
any withdrawal. Neither limb to the opinion is at all persuasive. The 2017 Act, as it now is, clearly 
authorised Article 50 to be invoked, as it subsequently was in March 2017, and in due course the EU 
Treaties will cease to have effect in the UK. The Opinion seriously misconstrues the principle of 
legality (as in quite a different way did the majority in Miller), posits an absurd reading of 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V intention in enacting the 2017 Bill, and is flatly at odds with the premise of Miller that 
triggering Article 50 will in due course lead to the termination of EU legal rights.  So the Opinion is 
hopeless, despite the eminence of its authors, and should be rejected.103 Yet, it is nonetheless being 
deployed in parliamentary politics, with some MPs and others warning the Government, and other 
MPs, of the risks of a replay of Miller if the right type of legislation is not forthcoming.   
 
In a recent article, Helen Mountfield QC (one of the authors of the Opinion, who was also one 
of the barristers in Miller) reflected on other legal consequences of the judgment.104 She speculates 
about the likelihood of legal challenges to the exercise of the prerogative to withdraw from the ECHR 
or to commit the UK to international treaties that call for domestic legal change.105 These would be 
far-reaching changes to our constitutional arrangements.  They are not spelled out in Miller, which 
PLJKW YHU\ ZHOO EH OLPLWHG RQ LWV RZQ WHUPV WR WKH VSHFLILF FRQWH[W RI (8 ODZ¶V UHception. The 
judicially-divined principle on which the judgment is grounded²the constitutional importance of 
withdrawal from the EU²is at best uncertain. Mountfield is doubtless right that Miller encourages 
future litigation. Whether such litigation would succeed may depend on the extent to which the bar, 
EHQFK DQG DFDGHP\ UHPDLQ LQ D VWDWH RI DODUP DQG ZKHWKHU WKH VKRUWFRPLQJV RI WKH PDMRULW\¶V
reasoning in Miller are frankly acknowledged, not least by the legal community itself. However, the 
process of withdrawal from the EU is far from straightforward and the legal and political culture that 
gave rise to the Miller litigation and the Supreme Court judgment may not be spent. In which case, 
there is a real risk that the post-referendum dynamics may run and run, with lawyers leveraging 
MXGLFLDOSURFHVV IRUSROLWLFDODGYDQWDJHDQG WKHFRXUWV IDLOLQJ WRKHHG/RUG5HHG¶V VDJHDGPRQLWLRQ
WKDWµWKHOHJDOLVDWLRQRISROLWLFDOLVVXHVLVQRWDOZD\VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\DSSURSULDWHDQGPD\EHIUDXJKW
with risk, not least IRUWKHMXGLFLDU\¶106  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
There was nothing close to a constitutional crisis in the sequence of decisions by which Parliament 
provided for a referendum on membership of the EU, the electorate voted for withdrawal, and the 
Government undertook to trigger Article 50 and begin the process of leaving the EU. The constitution 
is open to radical politics and often relies on political discipline, rather than legal disability, to restrain 
abuse of power. For some, one of the primary virtues of EU membership has been precisely to overlay 
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this scheme with hard-edged legal control. Many lawyers and others were dismayed by the way in 
which the traditional constitutional scheme (with its latent potential for radical politics) was being 
used to unpick the UK¶V membership of the EU. The Miller litigation is an episode in the politics of 
Brexit, part of an elite-led rearguard action waged against implementation of the referendum. The 
PDMRULW\¶V judgment cannot be properly understood apart from the political character and context of 
the litigation and the related crisis of confidence in our constitutional order on the part of many in 
public life.107 The judgment did not itself cause a crisis but it might easily have provoked serious and 
sustained tensions if the political context had been different. Indeed, the mostly calm and patient 
reaction of ministers and other elected politicians to the legal proceedings in Miller is commendable, 
and a sharp contrast with the post-referendum panic of many others in politics, the legal profession 
and the academy. Judges are on safe ground when they hew close to the law; when they depart from 
law, or extend it in novel ways, they expose themselves to political criticism. The Supreme &RXUW¶V 
judgment was very weak and should be remembered as such. Misunderstanding of and lack of respect 
for the political constitution is at the heart of Miller. If judges and others fail to recognize these 
shortcomings we may be doomed to witness further attempts to misuse the law to gain advantage in 
the political process.  
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